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Age
JACK M. BALKIN†
INTRODUCTION1
We are now well into America’s Second Gilded Age. The
First Gilded Age was the era of industrial capitalism that
began in the 1870s and 1880s and continued through the
first years of the twentieth century, leading to the
Progressive Era.2 It produced huge fortunes, political
corruption, and vast inequalities of wealth, so much so that
people became concerned that they would endanger
American democracy.

† Knight Professor of Constitutional Law and the First Amendment; Director,
The Information Society Project, Yale Law School. This lecture is based on the
2018 James McCormick Mitchell Lecture that I gave at the University of
Buffalo School of Law on April 13, 2018. My thanks to the faculty of the
University of Buffalo for the invitation and for their gracious hospitality.
1. The introduction to this article was adapted and revised for a blog post
on the Law and Political Economy Blog. Jack M. Balkin, The Political Economy
of Freedom of Speech in the Second Gilded Age, L. & POL. ECON., (July 4, 2018),
https://lpeblog.org/2018/07/04/the-political-economy-of-freedom-of-speech-in-thesecond-gilded-age/.
2. On the First Gilded Age, see RICHARD WHITE, THE REPUBLIC FOR WHICH
IT STANDS: THE UNITED STATES DURING RECONSTRUCTION AND THE GILDED AGE,
1865–1896 (2017).
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The Second Gilded Age begins, more or less, with the
beginning of the digital revolution in the 1980s, but it really
takes off in the early years of the commercial Internet in
the 1990s, and it continues to the present day. It is
characterized by the rise of social media and the
development and implementation of algorithms, artificial
intelligence, and robotics. For this reason I call our present
era the Algorithmic Society.
If the First Gilded Age is the age of industrial
capitalism, the Second Gilded Age is the age of digital or
informational capitalism. It too has produced great fortunes
and led to concerns that increasing concentrations of wealth
and economic inequality are endangering American
democracy. Like the First Gilded Age, it is also a time of
deep political corruption and despair about the future of
American democracy. It has not yet given way to a second
Progressive Era, but every day I see signs that this is where
we are headed.
There is a large literature criticizing the judicial
doctrines of the First Amendment and how they are slanted
toward the interests of corporations (and capital generally)
in the Second Gilded Age.3 The most obvious examples are
the federal courts’ recent decisions on commercial speech
and campaign finance regulation.4 These are interesting

3. See, e.g., Charlotte Garden, The Deregulatory First Amendment at Work,
51 HARV. CIV. RTS.-CIV. LIBERTIES L. REV. 323 (2016); Jeremy K. Kessler &
David E. Pozen, The Search for an Egalitarian First Amendment, 118 COLUM. L.
REV. 1953 (2018); Jedediah Purdy, Beyond the Bosses’ Constitution: Toward a
Social-Democratic First Amendment, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 2161 (2018); Amanda
Shanor, The New Lochner, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 133 (2016); Tim Wu, The Right to
Evade Regulation: How Corporations Hijacked the First Amendment, NEW
REPUBLIC
(June
3,
2013),
http://newrepublic.com/article/113294/howcorporations-hijacked-first-amendment-evade-regulation.
4. See, e.g., Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps., Council 31,
138 S. Ct. 2448, 2478 (2018) (holding that requiring nonmembers of public
sector unions to pay fees toward collective bargaining violates the First
Amendment); Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361,
2378 (2018) (striking down California law requiring pro-life pregnancy centers
to provide certain factual information to patients); Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct.
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and important topics, but they are not the subject of today’s
lecture.
Instead, I want to focus on what we might call the
political economy of free speech in the digital age. The basic
question is this: How does our political and economic
system pay for a digital public sphere? The answer is that it
pays for it largely through digital surveillance and through
finding new ways to make money out of personal data.
Digital capitalism in the Second Gilded Age features an
implicit bargain: a seemingly unlimited freedom to speak in
exchange for the right to surveil and manipulate end-users.
In this lecture I discuss the economic and political forces
that shaped this bargain and their costs. I will use the
recent scandal over Facebook’s privacy policies as an
example of the problem.
The First Amendment plays a role in this story, but not
the role that you might expect. One of the interesting
features of the digital age is that the protection of freedom
of expression has begun to detach from the judicial
doctrines of the First Amendment, so that, as interpreted
by courts, the First Amendment is increasingly irrelevant to
the protection of freedom of speech online.5
2618, 2644 (2014) (striking down agency-fee provision of Illinois’s Public Labor
Relations Act); McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185, 227 (2014) (striking down
aggregate limits on federal campaign contributions); Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s
Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721, 754, 755 (2011) (striking down
Arizona law providing “matching funds” to publicly funded state candidates
when privately funded opponents spend over a certain amount); Sorrell v. IMS
Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 580 (2011) (striking down a Vermont law restricting
the sale and disclosure of physicians’ prescription records); Citizens United v.
FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 372 (2010) (striking down statutory limits on corporate
electioneering).
5. Jack M. Balkin, Free Speech in the Algorithmic Society: Big Data,
Private Governance, and New School Speech Regulation, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1149, 1152 (2018) [hereinafter Balkin, Free Speech in the Algorithmic Society];
Jack M. Balkin, The Future of Free Expression in a Digital Age, 36 PEPP. L. REV.
427, 432–33, 443–44 (2009). See generally Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and
Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of Expression for the Information
Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 19–22, 46–51 (2004) [hereinafter Balkin, Digital
Speech and Democratic Culture].
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Why is that? Well, much of our practical ability to
speak online depends on an infrastructure of digital
communication—broadband companies, domain name
registrars and registries, webhosting services, caching and
security services, search engines, and social media
companies. That infrastructure is owned and operated by
private parties, not by the state. Thus, in most cases, the
businesses that provide the digital infrastructure of free
expression are not state actors bound by the First
Amendment. If we want to protect people’s privacy and
freedom of speech from overreaching by digital media
companies, the First Amendment will not be our primary
line of defense. Nor will the Fourth Amendment, or the rest
of the Bill of Rights, for that matter.
The First Amendment is relevant, but in a different
way. It may be a potential obstacle to laws that try to
regulate private infrastructure owners in order to protect
end-users’ freedom of speech and privacy. One example
would be the argument, rejected by the D.C. Circuit, but
promoted by various corporations, that network neutrality
regulations violate the free speech rights of broadband
companies.6
A second example would be an argument by social
media companies that restricting how they use, distribute,
or sell the consumer data that they collect in the course of
their operations violates the First Amendment, because the
data is speech or knowledge, and it is unconstitutional to

6. See
Stuart
Minor
Benjamin,
Transmitting,
Editing,
and
Communicating: Determining What “The Freedom of Speech” Encompasses, 60
DUKE L.J. 1673, 1696–712 (2011) (considering First Amendment challenges to
network neutrality and concluding that network neutrality rules and common
carriage obligations in telecommunications law do not violate the First
Amendment); Susan Crawford, First Amendment Common Sense, 127 HARV. L.
REV. 2343 (2014) (same). Compare United States Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 825
F.3d 674, 740–44 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (rejecting First Amendment challenge to
network neutrality rules), reh’g denied, 855 F.3d 381 (D.C. Cir. 2017), with id.
at 426–35 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (arguing that FCC order violates the
First Amendment).
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restrict its use, sale, or distribution.7 The United States has
not yet passed comprehensive digital privacy regulation,
but when it attempts to, I expect that companies will make
precisely this kind of argument against passage; and they
will probably use the First Amendment to challenge any
such legislation in the federal courts.
In short, the First Amendment, as currently interpreted
by federal courts, may be of little help in securing the
practical ability to speak through the privately-owned
digital infrastructure of communication; in some cases the
judicially created doctrines of the First Amendment may
even be a positive hindrance.
That is why it is very important to distinguish the
political value of freedom of speech from the judicially
created doctrines of the First Amendment. To make the
principles of the First Amendment live in our current age,
we must look beyond the latest pronouncements of the
federal courts. We must look at the political economy of
digital speech. We must ask what dangers that political
economy has created for end-users, and what kinds of
reforms would best protect their interests. I’ve discussed a
number of such reforms elsewhere;8 here I will focus on the
duties of good faith and non-manipulation that
infrastructure owners should have toward the people who
use their facilities to communicate.
The recent scandal over Facebook and Cambridge
Analytica is a perfect example of these problems; you might
7. See IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. at 564–66 (applying “heightened judicial
scrutiny” to Vermont’s law regulating prescription data because it made
content- and speaker-based distinctions); U.S. West, Inc. v. FCC, 182 F.3d 1224,
1232–33 (10th Cir. 1999) (determining that restrictions on the sale of consumer
data about telephone customers was a restriction on commercial speech because
it interfered with telephone company’s ability to target customers for
advertising purposes); Jane Bambauer, Is Data Speech?, 66 STAN. L. REV. 57,
84–86 (2014) (explaining why the right to collect and create information
suggests a broad right to record).
8. Jack M. Balkin, Free Speech is a Triangle, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 2011
(2018).
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say that it is a characteristic scandal of the Second Gilded
Age. That is because it revolves around how digital
infrastructure companies make their money and how they
affect the public sphere in the process. The scandal also
reveals a basic problem of freedom of speech in the Second
Gilded Age: Digital privacy undergirds our freedom of
expression,9 but the way we pay for freedom of expression
perpetually threatens our digital privacy. This is the irony
of the digital era: An era that promised unbounded
opportunities for freedom of expression is also an era of
increasing digital control and surveillance. The same
technological advances allow both results.
I’ll use the Facebook/Cambridge Analytica scandal to
explain how the conditions that make free speech possible
have changed from the twentieth to the twenty-first
centuries. I will also use it to introduce one of the key
concepts I’ve advocated for in previous work—the idea that
digital media companies are information fiduciaries who
have duties of care and loyalty toward their end-users.10
THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AND
TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY MEDIA
What are the characteristic differences between
twentieth-century media and twenty-first-century media?
The media that developed during the twentieth century
(and that continue to this day) are primarily mass media—
newspapers, publishing houses, and broadcast media like
radio, television and cable. Mass media feature a relatively
small number of speakers who publish or transmit content
to mass audiences. In mass communication, many people
form the audience, but few get to participate as speakers.
Thus, its basic structure is few-to-many. There have always

9. See generally NEIL RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY: RETHINKING CIVIL
LIBERTIES IN THE DIGITAL AGE (2015).
10. Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1183 (2016).
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been exceptions of course: telephone communication is oneto-one. Ham radio equipment allows people with relatively
little money to broadcast. But for the most part, the
twentieth-century’s dominant media were closed to the vast
majority of people who wanted to publish or broadcast their
own content.
A second important feature of twentieth-century-style
media is that the publishers, broadcasters, and movie
studios produce most of the content they publish or
broadcast, or else contract with a relatively small number of
people and businesses to provide content. The business of
mass media is not to publish the content of the vast
majority of ordinary citizens—rather, the latter form their
audience, not their content providers. That’s why mass
communication
industries
developed with
various
specialties:
producers,
directors,
editors,
actors,
announcers, entertainers, and so on.
By contrast, twenty-first-century media are organized
differently. They do not assume that only a small number of
people will speak to a vast audience. Communication is not
only one-to-many or few-to-many. It is also many-to-many.
Everyone
can
participate
in
twenty-first-century
communications media. This makes them more like
telephones, but with an important difference. Instead of
communicating with one other person, people can
communicate with an indefinite number of people. They can
also engage in mass communication. They can also be
broadcasters.
The promise of twenty-first-century media is what I
have called a democratic culture—a culture of mass
participation rather than the culture of mass audiences
that characterized the twentieth century.11 Everyone can,
in theory, participate in mass communication, and everyone
can have access to media that, in theory, could be viewed or
11. See Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture, supra note 5, at 9–
12.

986

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

read by people around the world, even if, in practice, not
everyone is interested in everything that everyone else has
to say. People can address themselves to a small number of
people, but they can also speak to an indefinite public.
The media companies of the early twenty-first century
are also different from those that arose in the early to midtwentieth century. Their primary business is not
broadcasting their own content or the content of a small
number of business partners. Rather, their job is to
transmit or serve as a platform for everyone’s content, and
their
business
models
actively
encourage
mass
participation. Very few people got to write for the
twentieth-century version of the New York Times. But
everyone can post on Facebook, and, moreover, Facebook
wants you to post, as often as possible. Google wants you to
create as many webpages as you like so that it can index
them. Pinterest and Instagram want you to post lots of
photos, Twitter wants you to tweet to your heart’s content,
and so on.
How to pay for the public sphere
The political economy of freedom of speech concerns,
among other things, how to pay for a system of free
expression in a given technological and social context.
Despite the name, a system of free expression is not itself
free; it requires investments in capital and infrastructure,
particular forms of labor (and skills), and a set of social
practices that interact with the communications technology
of the time.
This question—how to pay for a robust sphere of public
discourse—is at the heart of the Facebook/Cambridge
Analytica scandal. That is because the scandal emerged
from how Facebook finances its platform for social
communication. Facebook makes its money primarily
through selling advertising, matching advertisers with endusers. It performs this matching by collecting, processing,
and analyzing data about its end-users. Now if end-users

2018]

SECOND GILDED AGE

987

aren’t on Facebook, they won’t see those ads, so it’s
important to make sure that end-users remain online as
much as possible. To this end, Facebook also uses the same
data to curate its feeds, trying to come up with ever new
ways to entice its end-users to stay on the site and give
Facebook ever more of their attention.
Twentieth-century media was paid for by a combination
of advertising, sales of media goods, and subscription fees.
Newspaper companies sold individual newspapers on
newsstands and in stores; they sold subscriptions; and they
also sold advertising space. Broadcasters were in a
somewhat different position. Because, until very recently,
all broadcast radio was free, radio stations made money
primarily through selling ads. Book publishers got most of
their money from the purchases of books, and in some
cases, through subscription services like book-of-the-month
clubs. Relatively little money came from advertising within
books, although magazines often have lots of
advertisements that help pay for the costs of publication.
Cable companies made money through a combination of
subscriptions, pay-per-view, and advertising.
If a company depends on advertising, it’s very
important to place the ads in front of people who might
want to buy the products. But in the twentieth century,
advertising could not be easily or precisely targeted at the
individual level. One could do a bit of targeting—
magazines, for example, appeal to different audiences, as do
radio stations that specialize in certain kinds of music.
Advertisers who wanted to reach people interested in sports
or in fashion might advertise in Sports Illustrated or Elle,
respectively.
Yet general-interest newspapers did not want to appeal
to specialized audiences like magazines or radio stations
did
because
they
relied
heavily
on
classified
advertisements, and so they wanted to appeal to the widest
possible audience. The desire for the broadest possible
audience limited their strategies for targeted advertising.
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Some twentieth-century media attempted to target
advertisements, but the techniques were not very precise,
and aimed mostly at large demographic categories. Other
media actively sought general audiences and therefore
found targeting counterproductive, although the ads might
be directed at those consumers most likely to purchase
goods—for example, the fabled 18–49 demographic.
These are the business models that financed twentiethcentury media, and hence financed the system of free
expression, and the creation of a robust public sphere with
diverse and antagonistic sources of information and
opinion. The economic structure of twentieth-century media
shaped what kind of public sphere we would have.
We are in a different world now. But in this new world,
the same basic problems remain. What business models
make it possible for an economy to produce a robust public
sphere of discussion and debate? How do we ensure diverse
and antagonistic sources of information and opinion? How
do we finance the kind of public sphere that is necessary for
democracy, whether political democracy, or, as in my own
theory of the First Amendment, cultural democracy?
It is entirely possible that we won’t be able to finance
the kind of digital public sphere that is best for political or
cultural democracy. After all, the public sphere produced by
the twentieth-century media ecology was skewed in many
different ways; it had its own blind spots and biases.
The quality of the digital public sphere will depend in
part on the business models of twenty-first-century media
companies: Facebook, Google, YouTube, Twitter, Pinterest,
and Instagram, are the most well-known examples. These
companies originally didn’t think of themselves as media
companies at all, but rather as technology companies.
Gradually, they came to understand that they were the
most important players in the digital public sphere, and
that, in different ways, they acted as gatekeepers, as
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newspapers and broadcast stations had in the twentieth
century.12 These digital companies, in short, discovered that
they were media companies whether they liked it or not.13
The twentieth-century public sphere depended heavily
on for-profit business models. Is there any alternative? One
way of avoiding dependence on for-profit business models
would be to turn to public provisioning. Some nations have
national broadcasters, for example, the BBC in Great
Britain, or the CBC in Canada.14 Some countries also have
state-owned newspapers, although this is somewhat rarer
in Western democracies.15
The government could own and run the broadband
system within a country. It’s certainly possible to have
municipal wifi, although broadband companies have done
their best to try to prevent it in the United States. One
could also create a nationalized social media company—a
sort of public option to Facebook and Twitter. One could
even have a nationalized search engine—because one can’t
have an effective system of digital communication without
search engines.
Nationalization of search engines and social media has
been less frequent in Western democracies, partly due to
the enormous startup costs for each country. Moreover, at
least in the United States, a national search engine that
made decisions about which links to prioritize and which to
demote, or a government social media company that
imposed the kinds of civility rules that Facebook and

12. See Balkin, Free Speech in the Algorithmic Society, supra note 5, at
1180–81.
13. Id. at 1181.
14. Who We Are: At a Glance, Linked to Inside the BBC, BBC,
https://www.bbc.co.uk/corporate2/insidethebbc/whoweare/ataglance (last visited
Oct. 4, 2018); Who We Are, What We Do: Canadian, CBC, http://www.cbc.radiocanada.ca/en/explore/who-we-are-what-we-do/canadian/ (last visited Oct. 4,
2018).
15. See Simeon Djankov et al., Who Owns the Media?, 46 J.L. & ECON. 341,
363 (2003).
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Twitter employ, might raise serious problems under the
First Amendment—unless all of its activities could be
classified as government speech.16 In China, however, there
are close links between the government and the largest
search engine Baidu, and between the government and the
dominant social media companies, all of whom cooperate
with the central government’s requests for surveillance and
censorship.17 That, of course, is because the Chinese
government wants to regulate and surveil its citizens’
speech far more than Western democracies would tolerate.18
In the United States, as in many other places in the
world, the Internet infrastructure is not owned by the
government. Broadband companies, wifi companies, search
engines, and social media platforms are privately owned.
That means that the digital public sphere is not publicly
provisioned. It has to turn a profit.
How do these companies make money? For basic
Internet
services—such
as
broadband
companies,
webhosting services, storage services, and domain name
registries and registrars—the answer has generally been
subscription, as it was for twentieth-century media like
telephones and cable television.
But for search engines and social media platforms, the
business model has largely been driven by advertising.
Moreover, twenty-first-century technology made it possible
to engage in targeted advertising of individuals in ways
that were never possible in the twentieth century.

16. Compare Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S.
Ct. 2239, 2253 (2015) (holding that government may make content distinctions
with respect to its own speech), with Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Ariz., 135 S. Ct.
2218, 2231 (2015) (holding that content based regulations of private speech are
subject to strict scrutiny).
17. Social Media and Censorship in China: How Is It Different to the West?,
BBC (Sept. 26, 2017), http://www.bbc.co.uk/newsbeat/article/41398423/socialmedia-and-censorship-in-china-how-is-it-different-to-the-west.
18. Id.
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THE INFRASTRUCTURE OF FREE EXPRESSION IS THE
INFRASTRUCTURE OF SURVEILLANCE
Individualized targeting becomes possible because
everything that people do online produces (or can produce)
recordable data—the location of their computer or phone,
the answers they give to quizzes, the goods they purchase,
the sites they visit, the people they contact, the files they
download, even their keystrokes. Every action in cyberspace
is potentially recordable; it is just a matter of whether the
recording is implemented and the data is stored. Companies
can use all of this data to construct social graphs of
individuals: who they talk to, who their friends are, what
sites they visit, what they purchase, what they like and
dislike, and so on. This also allows the construction of
metadata and digital dossiers about individuals, which, in
turn, assist companies (and governments) in forming
judgments and predictions about them.
This degree of data surveillance and inference was not
really possible in the twentieth century. For example, if you
purchased a paperback book, the publisher could not tell
whether you had actually read the book. But with Kindle
applications, Amazon can tell how far you have read in a
book and how long it took you. Your reading habits are
traceable.
One can generalize this point. Almost every new media
application of the early twenty-first century is both a
method of communication and a method of surveillance.
Twenty-first-century media offer ever more precise methods
for surveilling and predicting the behavior of their endusers and the people those end-users communicate with.
Nor is that all. We are rapidly moving into a world
dominated by the Internet of Things and personal robots. In
the Internet of Things, every appliance, indeed, every
possession, can, in theory, reveal information about its
owners and operators. People don’t even have to
communicate with other human beings to be surveilled. A
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whole new generation of applications and appliances are
devoted to getting you to talk to them: Siri, Alexa, Cortana,
and their friends really want to know what you think.
There is an ironic similarity to the world of Downton
Abbey, the BBC series about British nobility in the first
part of the twentieth century and their relationships with
their servants. The butlers, valets, maids, and footmen are
always standing by ready to serve the nobility. They are
always present, and they don’t say anything unless they are
spoken to, but they are always listening. There is a wellknown saying that “No man is a hero to his own valet.” I
would say that no one is a hero to Siri or Alexa.
A twentieth-century radio station could not surveil its
listeners, and a twentieth-century television could not
surveil its viewers—unless they agreed to be a Nielsen
family. With cable television, however, it became possible to
have limited forms of surveillance, and so it is no surprise
that Congress passed an early form of privacy legislation to
govern cable.19
By contrast, in twenty-first-century media, surveillance
is the norm rather than the exception. Everything becomes
traceable, and the possibilities for surveillance explode.
Even if firms only collect very basic metadata—whom endusers contacted, what sites they visited, and for how long—
firms can still can generate a great deal of information
about their end-users and those they communicate with.
With sufficient computing power and computer storage,
companies can analyze this data and make judgments. But
a further characteristic of the digital age is that over time
the cost of computation and the cost of storage become ever
more inexpensive, thus, facilitating new forms of
surveillance, analysis, and prediction.
Surveillance, data collection, and data analysis are, by

19. See Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98
Stat. 2779 (1984).
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now, central to the twenty-first-century media ecology and,
for that matter, to twenty-first-century capitalism.
Surveillance, data collection, and data analysis fund key
aspects of the digital infrastructure—as well as many other
applications and services. This means that the
infrastructure of freedom of expression—the infrastructure
that you use to communicate with your friends and
relatives, the infrastructure that you use to post your cat
videos, the infrastructure that you use to post pictures of
your vacation so that all of your friends will be jealous of
you, the infrastructure that you use to post your
engagement announcements or your birthday celebration—
is also the infrastructure that companies use to surveil you
and to record your movements, contacts, habits, likes, and
dislikes. The two are one and the same.
The infrastructure of digital free expression is the
infrastructure of digital surveillance.
Once again, the government could provide all of this
infrastructure—from broadband to social networks to
search engines—and fund it with tax revenues or deficit
spending. But in that case, the infrastructure of free
expression would be the infrastructure of government
surveillance. As it is, the government repeatedly seeks to
harness the technologies of private surveillance for its own
ends. If the government owned the infrastructure, it could
eliminate the middle man. It could collect enormous
amounts of data about people’s habits, locations, and
preferences simply by operating social media and search
engines, which it could then analyze to make predictions
about people’s likely behavior. The Fourth Amendment
would provide little restraint, because, by hypothesis,
people willingly offer data about themselves in order to use
the government-provided service.
Therefore, to the extent that one turns to government
provisioning as an alternative to private companies, it will
be necessary to have extremely strong safeguards against
the collection, collation, and analysis of data willingly given
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to government infrastructure providers. Put more bluntly,
politicians, law enforcement officials, and bureaucrats alike
would have to have the political will to prevent the
government (and themselves) from collecting all that data
and using it. I think it is very unlikely that government
actors will be able to restrain themselves.
Failing the development of a public option, then, the
current system primarily involves a system of private
digital surveillance, which both private entities and
governments seek to harness for their own ends.
The grand bargain of twenty-first-century media looks
like this: Privately-owned infrastructure companies will
provide you with many different valuable services. They
will provide you with a search engine that is nothing short
of miraculous—that allows you to find anything you want
virtually instantaneously. They will provide you with social
media that allow you to publish and express almost
anything your heart could desire. Indeed, they will
encourage you to publish and to communicate with others,
repeatedly and incessantly. End-users get all of these
services, all of this stuff—and they get it all for free. And in
return, media owners get to collect their data, analyze it,
and use it to predict, control, and nudge what end-users do.
It is theoretically possible that search engines and
social media sites could forsake data collection and analysis
by forsaking advertising revenue. They could move to a
subscription service—that is how broadband and DNS
registries operate. We have already seen this business
model in operation with various streaming services such as
Spotify, Pandora, Hulu, and Netflix. These companies offer
a combination of subscription and free services that are
paid for by data surveillance. Yet it’s important to recognize
that even if social media companies offered tiered services
like Spotify and Pandora—that is, free services plus
subscription services—there is no reason to think that the
result would be less surveillance of the people who pay for
the subscriptions. Subscribers might get fewer ads in their
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feeds, but their social graph and personal data might be
just as valuable to the company and to its business
partners.
In any case, a subscription model has disadvantages for
social media companies because it might produce a far
smaller user base, and therefore less interesting and
intriguing content that would keep end-users coming back
for more. By contrast, Facebook’s existing business model of
free services in exchange for data surveillance leads it to try
to get as many people as possible to join Facebook, to visit
the site as often as possible, to engage with the site as often
as possible, and spend as much time on the site as possible.
The twentieth-century model of broadcast media and
mass media was a model of scarcity of media access; not
everyone got to publish in the New York Times or broadcast
on CBS. The scarcity of twenty-first-century media is the
scarcity of attention—the scarcity of eyeballs.20 To continue
to grow—and thus continue to please its shareholders—
Facebook has two choices. First, it can attempt to increase
the total number of end-users. Facebook already has some
two billion users in a world of seven billion potential
customers.21 Second, Facebook can grow by finding ever
new ways to get its end-users to spend more and more time
on the site. The second strategy dominates over time, and
this is why, as Tim Wu has explained, social media sites
like Facebook try to addict you—to engage you and keep

20. See Herbert A. Simon, Designing Organizations for an Information-Rich
World, in COMPUTERS, COMMUNICATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 37, 40
(Martin Greenberger ed., 1971) (“[A] wealth of information creates a poverty of
attention . . . .”); ZEYNEP TUFEKCI, TWITTER AND TEAR GAS: THE POWER AND
FRAGILITY OF NETWORKED PROTEST 271 (2017); Balkin, Digital Speech and
Democratic Culture, supra note 5, at 7 (“The digital revolution made a different
kind of scarcity salient. It is not the scarcity of bandwidth but the scarcity of
audiences, and, in particular, scarcity of audience attention.”).
21. Number of Monthly Active Facebook Users Worldwide as of 2nd Quarter
2018 (in Millions), STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/264810
/number-of-monthly-active-facebook-users-worldwide/ (last visited Oct. 2, 2018).
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you coming back for more, and more, and more.22 The
theoretical limit for a company like Facebook is all seven
billion people in the world spending twenty-four hours a
day on Facebook—unless, somehow, they get the folks on
Alpha Centauri to sign up.
THREE PROBLEMS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY MODEL
The implicit bargain of twenty-first-century media
capitalism produces three interrelated issues: the problem
of private governance, the problem of new-school speech
regulation, and the problem of private surveillance. I have
already written a great deal about the first two,23 and so I
will only mention them in passing.
Private governance
The first set of issues concern how social media govern
us and the spaces we use to communicate with each other.
The problems of social media governance are manipulation
on the one hand, and arbitrariness and non-transparency
on the other.
First, social media curate and shape what we
experience on their sites. For example, people get
personalized feeds on Facebook—they don’t get all possible
posts of Facebook friends in the order in which they were
posted. Rather, Facebook tries to decide which posts will be
most engaging—most compulsive, interesting, and

22. TIM WU, THE ATTENTION MERCHANTS: THE EPIC SCRAMBLE TO GET INSIDE
OUR HEADS 289–302 (2016) (describing how social media companies attempt to
attract advertisers by cornering the market on attention and addicting
customers); Tim Wu, Subtle and Insidious, Technology Is Designed to Addict Us,
WASH. POST, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/subtle-and-insidioustechnology-is-designed-to-addict-us/2017/03/02/5b983ef4-fcee-11e6-99b4-9e613a
feb09f_story.html?utm_term=.74b2a3a0012f (last visited Nov. 11, 2018) (“[F]or
a product like Facebook, success and user addiction are the same thing.”).
23. Balkin, Free Speech in the Algorithmic Society, supra note 5; Jack M.
Balkin, Old-School/New-School Speech Regulation, 127 Harv. L. Rev. 2296
(2014) [hereinafter Balkin, Old-School/New-School Speech Regulation].
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addictive.24 It also tries to organize the order of posts to
make them more interesting and entertaining. Facebook
may also include posts or items from people who are not
one’s Facebook friends in order to create an entertaining,
engaging, and absorbing—some would say addictive—
experience.25 This creates a potential conflict of interest:
social media companies have natural incentives to
manipulate and even addict their end-users to increase
their profits.
Second, because social media companies encourage as
many people as possible to use their sites, the inevitable
result is incivility, trolling, and abuse. Digital media create
both a sense of immediacy and a sense of distance between
people; when this happens, some end-users will behave in
ways that they would be ashamed to behave when
confronting others face to face. Social media sites therefore
have to take on the role of governors, enforcing civility
norms and policing for threats, abuse, and harassment.
In this way, as Kate Klonick has argued, social media
companies become governors of their spaces, and not merely
facilitators of communication.26 Social media companies
spend an increasing amount of their time policing their
sites and deciding when and whether to take things down;
and when social media companies remove posts, suspend
users, or ban them, their operations are usually not

24. See, e.g., Victor Luckerson, Here’s How Facebook’s News Feed Actually
Works, TIME (July 9, 2015), http://time.com/collection-post/3950525/facebooknews-feed-algorithm/ (“[M]ost users see only a sliver of the potential posts in
their network each day.”).
25. Paul Lewis, ‘Our Minds Can Be Hijacked’: The Tech Insiders Who Fear a
Smartphone
Dystopia,
GUARDIAN
(Oct.
6,
2017,
1:00
AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/oct/05/smartphone-addictionsilicon-valley-dystopia (interviewing former employees at Google and Facebook
who report that technologies are designed to addict users and monopolize their
attention).
26. Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes
Governing Online Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1635–48 (2018) (describing
bureaucracies at Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter).
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transparent and offer little in the way of procedural due
process.27
New-school speech regulation
A second issue is what I call “new-school” speech
regulation. In more traditional, or “old-school” speech
regulation, states aim at speakers and twentieth-century
publishers and mass media. In “new-school” speech
regulation, states aim at owners of digital infrastructure in
order to get them to control or censor online speakers who
may be too numerous, difficult to locate, anonymous, or
outside the country.28 New-school speech regulation, in
other words, is the state’s attempt to harness private
infrastructure owners’ growing capacity to surveil and
govern the people who use the infrastructure, and to turn
these capacities to the state’s purposes. Examples are the
European Union’s “right to be forgotten,”29 and the E.U.’s
new digital hate speech rules—which involve agreements
with the big four media companies.30
Just as states try to use private infrastructure to block
or censor speech, they also try to use it to assist them with
surveillance.31 Data flows continuously through digital
companies’ facilities, creating ever more data and

27. Id. at 1648.
28. Balkin, Free Speech in the Algorithmic Society, supra note 5, at 1175;
Balkin, Old-School/New-School Speech Regulation, supra note 23, at 2298.
29. See Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección
de Datos, 2014 E.C.R. 317, ¶ 91; Robert C. Post, Data Privacy and Dignitary
Privacy: Google Spain, the Right to Be Forgotten, and the Construction of the
Public Sphere, 67 DUKE L.J. 981, 986 (2018).
30. See Code of Conduct on Countering Illegal Hate Speech Online,
STATEWATCH, https://www.statewatch.org/news/2017/sep/eu-com-illegal-contentonline-code-of-conduct.pdf (last visited Aug. 1, 2018); Countering Illegal Hate
Speech Online #NoPlace4Hate, EUR. COMMISSION (July 11, 2018),
https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/just/item-detail.cfm?item_id=54300
[https://perma.cc/L29F-3YGP].
31. Balkin, Old-School/New-School Speech Regulation, supra note 23, at
2297.
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metadata. All of this is especially intriguing to nationstates, who would like to make judgments and predictions,
to locate and identify people, and to trace and predict
crimes and national security threats.32 The information
collected by infrastructure owners becomes a tempting
target for nation-states—ever more tempting as
infrastructure providers become better and better at
collecting and analyzing this sort of information. Call this
the problem of public surveillance.33
Private surveillance
The third problem—which brings us to the
Facebook/Cambridge Analytica scandal—is not the problem
of state surveillance, but the problem of private
surveillance. According to the grand bargain of surveillance
capitalism, Facebook, Google and other media businesses
offer free or heavily subsidized services in exchange for
subjecting end-users to ever more effective ways of
collecting and analyzing data that people produce whenever
they interact with their sites. The goal is to turn this
resource into money. Companies achieve this goal through
private surveillance, data collection, and analysis—and by
either selling end-users to advertisers, or else selling the
data to others.
A familiar saying in the industry is that Big Data is the
New Oil.34 Data is a resource that is there for the taking—
just as pools of oil were just lying under the surface before
the Industrial Revolution.
If entrepreneurs like John D. Rockefeller could figure

32. Id. at 1155–57.
33. See id. at 2304–06, 2320, 2329–30 (explaining
infrastructure is a tempting target for governments).

why

private

34. Jonathan Vanian, Why Data Is the New Oil, FORTUNE (July 12, 2016),
http://fortune.com/2016/07/11/data-oil-brainstorm-tech; see Michael Palmer,
Data Is the New Oil, ANA MARKETING MAESTROS (Nov. 3, 2006, 5:43 AM),
http://ana.blogs.com/maestros/2006/11/data_is_the_new.html.
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out how to take that oil and refine it and sell it to other
people, they could finance industrial capitalism and make a
fortune in the process. In the same way, everyone leaves
traces of themselves and their activities—data—whenever
they use digital devices and wherever they go on the
Internet, and if somebody can just figure out how to collect
it, and refine it, and analyze it, harness it to make
calculations and predictions, or sell it to others to make
calculations and predictions, they can drive modern digital
capitalism—that is, surveillance capitalism—and they can
make a fortune in the process.
WORKING FOR THE MAN
Just as industrial capitalism made great fortunes, so
too has digital capitalism. Instead of Rockefeller, and
Vanderbilt, and Carnegie, we have Gates, and Zuckerberg,
and Brin, and Schmidt. Just as poorly paid workers in lousy
working conditions contributed to the fortunes of the First
Gilded Age, so everyone, at home or at work, in pajamas or
in business attire, contributes to the fortunes of the Second
Gilded Age. We are all working for the Man.
All of us are workers in data factories, whether we
know it or not. Every time you click on a link in Google,
every time you visit Facebook, every time you post on
Twitter, every time you upload a cat video on YouTube, you
are working for the Man.
Not Vanderbilt, Alphabet. Not Rockefeller, Zuckerberg.
This phenomenon is twenty-first-century capitalism’s
appropriation and reconfiguration of open-source or peerproduction methods, described and theorized in the early
2000s by Yochai Benkler.35 Benkler described how Linux
developers and Wikipedia created valuable information
goods through peer-production, with relatively little

35. See YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL
PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM (2006).

2018]

SECOND GILDED AGE

1001

investment
in
bureaucracies
and
management
36
hierarchies. Where Benkler saw possibilities for freer,
more participatory, and less coercive methods of business
organization and peer production, digital capitalists have
seen ways of saving money by reorganizing unpaid labor
and collecting data about end-users in order to produce
greater profits. This penguin is spying on you, collecting
your data, and waddling all the way to the bank.
All end-users contribute to the production of an
information good—the social media site—and its source of
wealth, that is, data. People visit Facebook and create data;
they like or dislike posts and create data; they post new
content and create data; and they attract others to the site
to read or view what they have posted. Even when you see
something you don’t like on Twitter or Facebook, you are
still working for the Man. Perhaps somebody made a racist
or abusive comment. You click a button to report the tweet
or post, or you send a message arguing that such-and-such
a post or comment is in violation of the company’s terms of
service. Even then, you are still working for the Man. Why?
Because the site needs an army of people to discover when
others violate its terms of service or community policies,
and you are helping provide that service.37 And in return,
what do you get? Not a salary. You get a free service in
which your data—and those of your friends and relatives—
is used to keep you coming back to the site, and to sell you
to advertisers and business partners.
That is why, although people say that Data is the New
Oil, I like to say that Data is Soylent Green.38 As Charlton

36. Id. at 60, 64–67, 70–73.
37. Catherine Buni & Soraya Chemaly, The Secret Rules of the Internet, VERGE
(Apr. 13, 2016), https://www.theverge.com/2016/4/13/11387934/internet-moderatorhistory-youtube-facebook-reddit-censorship-free-speech (“[U]sers are not so much
customers as uncompensated digital laborers who play dynamic and indispensable
functions (despite being largely uninformed about the ways in which their labor is
being used and capitalized).”).
38. Balkin, Free Speech in the Algorithmic Society, supra note 5, at 1154–57.
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Heston reminds us, Soylent Green is people. 39 You are your
data, and that data is the raw material of digital
capitalism. In the political economy of the early twenty-first
century, your data is the price of your freedom of
expression.
As noted above, digital media companies like Facebook
are always trying to find new ways to squeeze money out of
this raw material. One way to make money is to let other
people use the social graph of end-users. Businesses can
create applications which they can either place on
Facebook’s site itself, or they can use Facebook’s login as
their entry to the application. Once the end-user signs in to
Facebook, the third party can gain access to their social
graph—and, in some cases, the social graph of their
Facebook friends—and use that data to provide services, do
market research, sell advertisements, predict behavior, and
so on. Facebook, in turn, can take a cut of the profits from
the business.40 This was Facebook’s approach in its initial
years, and although it has modified its business practices
over the years, it is also the approach of many other digital
companies that collect your data and share it with third
parties.
Facebook has also provided pro bono access to scientific
researchers, who could download personal data to engage in
scientific studies.41 This strategy doesn’t make Facebook

39. SOYLENT GREEN (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. 1973); BradZ1, IT’S
PEOPLE!, YOUTUBE (Nov. 19, 2007), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8SpVFBbjpE.
40. Paul Lewis, ‘Utterly Horrifying’: Ex-Facebook Insider Says Covert Data
Harvesting Was Routine, GUARDIAN (Mar. 20, 2018, 7:46 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/mar/20/facebook-data-cambridgeanalytica-sandy-parakilas (explaining that under the policy, “‘a majority of
Facebook users’ could have had their data harvested by app developers without
their knowledge”).
41. See id.; James Sanders & Dan Patterson, Facebook Data Privacy
Scandal:
A
Cheat
Sheet,
TECHREPUBLIC
(Oct.
25,
2018)
https://www.techrepublic.com/article/facebook-data-privacy-scandal-a-cheatsheet/.
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money directly, but it enhances its connections with data
scientists around the world.
This is essentially what happened in the Cambridge
Analytica scandal. Aleksandr Kogan, a data scientist, used
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk to find people who were willing
to take a personality quiz for a dollar.42 Mechanical Turk
organizes the labor of strangers by offering them small
amounts of money to perform particular tasks. This is
another example of how money-making enterprises have
adapted distributed peer-production systems for their own
purposes.
People who took the quiz signed in to Facebook with
their username and password. This, in turn, gave Kogan
access to the Facebook data associated with the people
answering the quiz, as well as the data of all of their
Facebook friends, a practice that was apparently
permissible under Facebook’s then-existing data sharing
policies.43 This is how approximately 300,000 users allowed
Kogan access to the data of some 87 million people.44 Under
such a regime, the more popular a person is—the more
Facebook friends they have—the more valuable they are to
the company and its partners.
But Kogan wasn’t simply a data scientist. He was also

42. Carole Cadwalladr & Emma Graham-Harrison, How Cambridge
Analytica Turned Facebook ‘Likes’ into a Lucrative Political Tool, GUARDIAN
(Mar.
17,
2018,
9:02
AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology
/2018/mar/17/facebook-cambridge-analytica-kogan-data-algorithm;
Alex
Pasternack, A Facebook Scientist Tied to Cambridge Analytica Has Quietly Left
Facebook, FAST COMPANY (Sept. 6, 2018), https://www.fastcompany.com
/90231904/a-facebook-employee-tied-to-cambridge-analytica-quietly-leftfacebook.
43. Cadwalladr & Graham-Harrison, supra note 42.
44. See Michael Riley et al., Understanding the Facebook-Cambridge
Analytica Story, WASH. POST (Apr. 9, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/business/understanding-the-facebook-cambridge-analytica-story-quicktake/201
8/04/09/0f18d91c-3c1c-11e8-955b-7d2e19b79966_story.html (estimating that
300,000 people participated and that 87 million users had their data harvested).
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in cahoots with Cambridge Analytica.45 Thus, he
misrepresented himself to Facebook. He participated in
Facebook’s platform policy for researchers and scientists,
but he turned over the data to Cambridge Analytica, a forprofit political consulting company that uses personal data
to serve targeted political ads based on psychological
profiles.46
INFORMATION FIDUCIARIES
This led to a scandal. But what exactly is the nature of
this scandal? We should distinguish its various parts. One
aspect is foreign participation in American elections in
violation of federal campaign finance laws. Cambridge
Analytica is a U.K. political consulting firm and employs
many people who are not American citizens.47
A second aspect—targeted political ads—is not really
much of a scandal. Political ads are core protected speech
under the First Amendment. And political ads do not lose
their First Amendment projection simply because they are
targeted.
Targeted political ads—saying one thing to one group of
people and another to another group of people—is as
American as apple pie, or more correctly as apple pie to one
group of Americans and cherry pie to another group.
Indeed, ever more precise targeting of political
advertisements is the wave of the future, if the future has

45. Cadwalladr & Graham-Harrison, supra note 42.
46. Id.
47. Paul Seamus Ryan, Cambridge Analytica and Its Foreign National Staff
Violated
U.S.
Laws,
JUST
SECURITY
(Mar.
26,
2018),
https://www.justsecurity.org/54272/complaint-filed-cambridge-analytica-foreignnational-staff-violated-u-s-campaign-finance-law/; Craig Timberg & Tom
Hamburger, Former Cambridge Analytica Workers Say Firm Sent Foreigners to
Advise
U.S.
Campaigns,
WASH.
POST
(Mar.
25,
2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/former-cambridge-analytica-workerssay-firm-sent-foreigners-to-advise-us-campaigns/2018/03/25/6a0d7d90-2fa211e8-911f-ca7f68bff0fc_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.afcb22899ae1.
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not already arrived. 48 To make targeting effective, of course,
political operatives will need to know more and more about
voters, which means that they will need lots of data about
them, which means that they will either have to collect the
data themselves or purchase it from others. Hence, digital
capitalism predictably leads to new forms of political
surveillance—political in the sense that it is operated by
and for political parties, candidates, and their campaigns.
This is the model of the political organization as
database49—the organization of politics around the same
techniques that digital companies have already mastered to
advertise products, just as earlier political operatives copied
and mastered the techniques of Madison Avenue and
twentieth-century advertisers.50
A third aspect of the scandal is most important for
purposes of this lecture. The problem was not the revelation
that Facebook had entered into an unusual business
arrangement with a single company. The true scandal was
that giving third parties access to personal data, and using
personal data to manipulate people, were ordinary, run-ofthe-mill business practices. Facebook’s dealings with
Cambridge Analytica were the tip of a very large iceberg.51
Understood in this way, the Cambridge Analytical
scandal went to the heart of the grand bargain that pays for
the digital public sphere. It laid bare a central problem of
48. See Antonio García Martínez, How Trump Conquered Facebook—
Without Russian Ads, WIRED, (Feb. 23, 2018, 10:03 AM), https://www.wired.com
/story/how-trump-conquered-facebookwithout-russian-ads/.
49. Jack M. Balkin, The Last Days of Disco: Why the American Political
System is Dysfunctional, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1159, 1185–86 (2014) (describing the
phenomenon of “The Party as Database,” in which a “party’s electoral success
depends increasingly on its abilities at data mining and political surveillance of
potential voters and messaging to those voters.”).
50. See JOE MCGINNISS, THE SELLING OF THE PRESIDENT: THE CLASSICAL
ACCOUNT OF THE PACKAGING OF A CANDIDATE (Penguin Books 1988) (1968)
(describing the use of Madison Avenue techniques in the 1968 presidential
campaign).
51. Lewis, supra note 40; Sanders & Patterson, supra note 41.
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our age: how to preserve the benefits of a freely accessible
online public sphere while preventing digital companies
from abusing their roles as collectors, analyzers, and users
of personal data.
In order to do this, we have to rethink the role that
digital companies play in our lives, borrow some old ideas
from the law of the professions, and apply them to the
twenty-first-century companies who collect, analyze and use
our personal data for profit.
The central idea is this: We should regard the digital
media companies who collect and use our personal data as
information fiduciaries toward their end-users.52 Because
they are information fiduciaries, they have special duties of
care, confidentiality, and loyalty toward their end-users.53
Many of the biggest players in the Second Gilded Age—
Facebook, Twitter, Google and Microsoft—are information
fiduciaries.
What makes these companies information fiduciaries?
People increasingly depend on these companies to perform
services for them. The companies know a great deal about
their end-users, and they can use that knowledge in many
ways, but their end-users know next to nothing about their
internal operations.54 As a result, their end-users are
especially vulnerable to these companies, and they have to
trust that the companies will not abuse them, betray them,
or manipulate them to increase the company’s profit
margins.
These four features of the situation—(1) the company
provides special services based on special expertise; (2)
there is a great asymmetry in knowledge between the
company and its clients; (3) clients are especially vulnerable
to the company because of the company’s knowledge about

52. Balkin, supra note 10, at 1221.
53. Id. at 1207–08.
54. Id. at 1224–25.
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them; and (4) the need for clients to trust the company to
receive the benefit of the service—are standard reasons why
the law recognizes fiduciary relationships.55
The law has long understood that special relationships
of vulnerability and trust require special fiduciary
obligations.56 Examples are professionals like doctors,
lawyers, and estate managers.57 Each of them gains special
information about their clients that could easily be used to
their clients’ disadvantage. For this reason, law requires
them to act as fiduciaries toward their clients, with special
duties of care, good faith, loyalty, and non-manipulation.58
A new class of fiduciaries has emerged in the Second
Gilded Age. These new fiduciaries are the digital companies
that perform a wide range of individualized services for us
in return for the collection and monetization of our data.
Social media and search engine companies in particular are
among these new information fiduciaries of the digital age.
For example, Facebook provides an important service—
a social network—that many people find not only valuable
but indispensable. In the course of providing that service,
people provide enormous amounts of data about
themselves, making them (and their friends and loved ones)
ever more vulnerable to Facebook. Their lives become
transparent to Facebook, but Facebook’s operations are not
transparent to them. They have to trust that Facebook will
not use its special knowledge and abilities to abuse them or
manipulate them for its own profit and advantage.
Facebook’s right to hold and use personal data, in other
words, depends on its fiduciary duty not to take advantage
of its end-users’ vulnerability. It has a duty not to abuse the
trust that vulnerable end-users must place in Facebook in
55. Id. at 1221–23.
56. Id. at 1219.
57. Id. at 1208–09.
58. TAMAR FRANKEL, FIDUCIARY LAW 106–08 (2011); Balkin, supra note 10, at
1205–09.
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order for the company to provide its services. As Mark
Zuckerberg himself has said, if the company abuses that
trust, “we don’t deserve” to have your data. 59
This fiduciary duty arises out of a contractual
relationship—the terms of service or end-user license
agreement—that digital companies require of their endusers. But duties of an information fiduciary are not limited
to the specific terms of Facebook’s privacy policy—a
complicated contract that few people have actually read. If
Facebook’s duties were wholly based on the terms of the
contract, then it could make those duties vanish simply by
changing its privacy policy. Rather, these fiduciary
obligations exist on top of the contractual rights of the
parties.60
Information fiduciaries have three basic duties: a duty
of care, a duty of confidentiality, and a duty of loyalty. 61 The
duties of care and confidentiality require information
fiduciaries to keep data secure and not to disclose it to third
parties unless those third parties are equally trustworthy
and agree to the same duties of care, confidentiality, and
loyalty as the fiduciary.62 Thus, a digital company has a
duty to protect its end-users not merely from its own
actions, but also from the actions of those with whom it
shares data. Fiduciary obligations “run with the data,” so
that a digital company like Facebook has an obligation to
ensure that whenever it allows another person or business
to see, view, or employ Facebook’s end-users’ data, these

59. Lianna Brinded, Facebook Is Buying Print Ads to Apologize for the
Cambridge Analytica Scandal, QUARTZ (Mar. 25, 2018), https://qz.com/1236981
/facebook-and-mark-zuckerberg-buy-newspaper-ads-to-say-sorry/.
60. See FRANKEL, supra note 58, at 42–45; Balkin, supra note 10, at 1207.
61. See Balkin, supra note10, at 1206–08; Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond
Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879, 882
(explaining that fiduciaries “must be loyal to the interests of the other person”
and that “[t]he fiduciary’s duties go beyond mere fairness and honesty; they
oblige him to act to further the beneficiary’s best interests”).
62. Balkin, supra note 10, at 1220.
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persons and businesses must take on the same duties of
trust and non-manipulation that Facebook itself must take
on.63
Finally, the duty of loyalty means that an information
fiduciary must not use data to advantage itself at the
expense of its end-users, and it must proactively work to
avoid creating and acting on conflicts of interest between
itself and its end-users.64 What this means in practice will
depend on the nature of the business.65 Social media, like
many other digital companies, exchange free or heavily
subsidized services for the right to match end-users with
advertisers, including individually targeted ads. This in
itself could give rise to a conflict of interest, and regularly
has. But unless we are to outlaw all targeted
advertisements to subsidize digital services (which I would
oppose and might raise First Amendment concerns), the
proper solution is to limit the ways that digital companies
may use their customers’ data. The goal, in other words, is
to ameliorate or forestall the conflict of interest by requiring
companies to act in good faith, forbidding them from
manipulating or harming their end-users to increase their
profits, requiring them to vet and oversee contractual
partners with whom they share data, and preventing them
from giving access to third-parties who will manipulate or
harm their end-users.
The Cambridge Analytica scandal shows how these
fiduciary obligations work in practice. Facebook failed at all
three of them. It failed in its duties of care and

63. Id. (duties “run with the data”); id. at 1233 (arguing that digital
information fiduciaries “may also have duties to ensure that, when they sell or
convey this information to others, duties of non-disclosure and nonmanipulation travel with the data”).
64. Id. at 1208.
65. FRANKEL, supra note 58, at 53 (noting that “[t]he process of recognizing
new fiduciary relationships is ongoing,” depending on the nature of their
services, the power relations and temptations they create, and the ability of
institutions and markets to control them); Balkin, supra note 10, at 1223, 1228.
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confidentiality because it did not vet its contractual
partners carefully enough. It did not make sure that it
shared end-user data only with trustworthy persons and
companies, and it did not ensure that its partners agreed to
the same duties of care, confidentiality and loyalty. It did
not sufficiently oversee and audit what Kogan and
Cambridge Analytica did with end-user data, and it did not
take steps to keep them from violating the interests of its
end-users for their own profit and advantage. Although
Kogan passed himself off as only a non-profit researcher,
Facebook made many similar arrangements with for-profit
companies in which it took a share of revenues in exchange
for data access. Thus, Facebook failed at its duty of loyalty
because it allowed third-parties to manipulate its end-users
in order to make more money for itself. Finally, when
Facebook learned about Kogan and Cambridge Analytica’s
behavior, it did not act quickly and effectively to claw back
all of its end-user’s data to protect them from further
breaches of data security and further manipulation.
In
short,
the
Cambridge
Analytica
scandal
demonstrated most of the things that an information
fiduciary should not do with its end-users’ data. That is
what made it such a characteristic scandal of the Second
Gilded Age. It exposed how the grand bargain of free
services for data—the bargain that makes the digital public
sphere possible—allows companies to betray the trust of the
vast numbers of people who rely on these companies in
their everyday lives.
Because of the economic logic that underpins the digital
public sphere, capitalism has created a new system of
relationships between us and digital media companies.
These relationships have created new forms of digital
vulnerability, and therefore these relationships should be
fiduciary relationships, relationships of trust. When
companies breach such a relationship of trust, they are not
protected by the First Amendment any more than doctors
and lawyers are protected by the First Amendment when
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they disclose sensitive information about their clients and
patients.66
I have given only a general introduction to the
obligations of digital information fiduciaries, and there is
much more that has to be worked out over time. There will
also be close cases in which it is not clear whether a digital
enterprise should be treated as an information fiduciary. To
deal with this problem, Jonathan Zittrain of Harvard Law
School and I have laid out a basic proposal for a Digital
Millennium Privacy Act.67 The DMPA would propose a new
grand bargain to protect digital privacy. It would grant
companies a safe harbor from state privacy regulation if
companies agree to take on the fiduciary duties of care,
confidentiality, and loyalty toward their end-users.
CONCLUSION
The Cambridge Analytica scandal is evidence that there
is something deeply wrong with the grand bargain that
pays for freedom of expression in the Second Gilded Age.
The point of the concept of information fiduciaries is to
rewrite that bargain, and to place the political economy of
digital speech in the Second Gilded Age on a fairer, more
decent footing.
The Second Gilded Age has produced vast fortunes, and
some of the most powerful companies that have ever
existed. But it has also given rise to a new class of
fiduciaries: companies with obligations of trust and good
faith to their end-users and to the public as a whole.
As the First Gilded Age drew to a close near the end of
the nineteenth century, things looked pretty grim for

66. See Balkin, supra note 10, at 1210–20 (explaining why fiduciary
relationships are treated differently under the First Amendment).
67. Jack M. Balkin & Jonathan Zittrain, A Grand Bargain to Make Tech
Companies
Trustworthy,
THE
ATLANTIC
(Oct.
3,
2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/10/information-fiduciary/5
02346/.
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American democracy. Government was essentially for sale.
America was dominated by what Teddy Roosevelt called
“the great malefactors of wealth.”68 Americans seemed
locked into a political economy of ever increasing oligarchy
and corruption. And if you had asked people about
American politics in 1895, they might well have despaired
about the future of American democracy.
But we know what happened after that. There was a
renaissance of reform and an era of gradual improvement of
American democracy, not perfect in all respects, but
certainly better than things stood at the end of the
nineteenth century. That is the message that I want to
leave you with. What we did once before, during the First
Gilded Age at the end of the nineteenth century, we can do
again, in the Second Gilded Age, at the beginning of the
twenty-first century. It will require a refusal to settle for
the status quo, and a belief in the long run success of
democracy. It will require mobilization, it will require
protest, and above all, it will require the long grind of
politics. But it has been done before, and we can do it once
again.

68. Theodore Roosevelt, Address of President Roosevelt on the Occasion of
the Laying of the Corner Stone of the Pilgrim Memorial Monument,
Provincetown, MA, (Aug. 20, 1907), in Washington, DC, Government Printing
Office, 1907, at 47.

